Moral education and moral choice
by George Dixon The Ohio State University A question of continuing importance for the foun .
• dations of education is whether the traditional loun· dational discipli nes are adequate to the educational ex· periences they help us analyze. Of course, this is not just a concern ol educators; researchers in lo undational areas are also led, at least occasionally, to ask how adequate their methods are for the analysis of human experience generally. But the question seems more persistent and bothersome for ed ucators who use the methods o f philosophy and the social sciences to understand ed ucational experiences. Somehow the greater need 10 connect theory with educational practice makes the question or methodological adequacy more immediate for the educational researcher. who can' t as easily push this con. earn into the backg round or wait for another gen· eratlon of research before translating theory into prac tice.
Certainly II is more c onvenient to push concern for method into the backgro und and get o n with the researc h at hand, for such problems are perennially troublesome and usually tied into classical philosophical paradoxes that defy quick resolution. One such paradox that is especially troublesom e in education generally and particularly puzzling in moral education is the In· dividuallcollective relationship mentioned by Professor Klohr in his essay " Emerging Foundations for Curriculum Theory. '" 20 Most people concerned with moral education are lamillar with the Individual/collec tive dilemma In rerms of two beliefs that seem to work in opposition to one another. On the one hand, we assert that actions which can be judged as moral or immoral necessarily Involve in· dividual choice. As moral agents, we can be neither praised nor blamed If we have no degree of choice or con· trol over our decisions and actions; one of the defining charac teristics o r ac tions that we call "moral " Is just this fac t of ind ividual responsibility. Ethical theories which focus on this factor of individual responsibility and duty share a Kantian emphasis on the formal aspects of moral decisions.
But there is obviously more to moral decision than in· d ividual duty and private choice. We must also assert that moral decisions are Influenced by circumstances outside the individual, circumstances that are connected with the time and place of choice, with specific rather than formal factors, with the history of the individual as it is situated between past experiences and expec tations for the future.
Moralists of the utilitarian persuasion wo uld, in fact, calcu late just suc h factors to the point of explaining how an individual is mos t likely to decide a moral question. Their emphasis on the collective or social side of the relationship aligns them rather clearly with the methods and emphasis of the social sciences. It is in this apparent conflic t between Kantian or formalis tic ethical theories and their utilitarian or naturalistic counterparts that we find one source of difficulty for the moral educator con· cerned wi th the foundations of his field.
For example, if the moral educator looks to phi losophy to clarify this relat ionship between Individual choice and social Influence, he finds that the problem gets worse before It gets better. Philosophers In this cen· tury, with a few notable exceptions, have regarded moral decisions as matters of private preference and individual feeling. They have preserved the necessarily Individual aspect or morality, but only at the cost o f putting most moral question s beyond reasonable discussion and public evaluation. The resu lt for moral educators has too often been one of reducing their task to helping students clarify their individual values, and while this Is a worthy vocation, it just begins to scratch the surface of the process of moral choice and value formation. For such clarification must Ignore the social nature o f moral ity; moral con· sensus becomes li ttle more than the tabulation of private interests. After individual value preferences have been clarified , the teacher must indeed be ready to move on quickly to the next topic of discussion; modern sub· jectivls t theories o f morality offer little help on the tough issues that logi cally follow Individual clarification.
The moral educator can tu rn to the social sciences for help in understanding how external factors condition moral choice, for the social sciences seem to concentrate on exactly those social or external factors that the values clarification approach tends to ignore. But that s trength in explaining how and why people choose and ac t as they do comes to the social sciences at Its own high cost. For the conclusion that seems implicit In most social science research is that external lactors determine Individual decisions and actions; the moral responsiblllty that educators seek to enhance turns out to be an illusion. From a social science perspective, action s can be explained and even predicted, but In the c ourse of such research we seem to remove the action ooing studied from the realm of morality. That Is, we can hardly praise or blame a person for " having made a choice" if that person has had a choice in the same way that Skinner's hen has had an egg. ' So far in this analysis I have stretched the opposing poles of the individual/collective paradox, si mplifying each position and ignoring those developmen ts in phi losophy and the social sciences which have worked to mitigate the split. Unfortunately, such developments tend to fall outside the mainstream of the various foundational disciplines, so that it is usually Quite d ifficult for educators to get in touch with them. This seems to me to explain why those curriculum theorists c alled Recon· ceptualists often look outside mainstream soc ial science and sometimes to disciplines like literature and art for red irection; they deliberately seek out researchers working on the fringes or crossing discipl inary lines In or· der to reconceptualize problems that have resisted traditional solutions. Thus we might say that even though some phi losophers and social scientists have begun to address the individual/collective paradox and have un· covered some promising directions for resolution, the paradox is still very much with us. And it proves to be especial ly debilitating In moral education, which has at its center the problemat ic relationship between individual choice and determining soc ial circumstances.
One philosopher and social theorist whose recent work may be helpful to moral educators is Jurgen Habermas. For a variety of reasons, his work is not generally known in this c ountry. although it is widely read in his own country of Germany and th roughou t Europe.
Habermas' work is admittedly difficult, especially for those with a phi losophical background in the Anglo· American tradition of empiricism. Moreover, those works by Habermas that have been translated into Eng lish for the most part do not address educational questions di· rectly. His most widely known work, Knowledge and Hu · man Interests, is in fact a critique o f positivism. And the education·oriented essays of Toward a Rational Society focus on problems of the German educational system during the 1960's and thus resist quick application to educ ational problems in this country.
But perhaps it is this very foreignness that makes Habermas· work significant to the problems o f ethical theory and moral education . For with his philosoph ical roots in Continental philosophy, especially in the works of Hegel and Marx, Habermas has been able to bring new light to the ind ividual/collective paradox that has defied so many Anglo·American researchers. This is not to say that Habermas avoids or rej ects philosophers and researchers in our tradition; he has, in fact, been influenced by philosophers as diverse as the American pragmatis t Charles Sanders Peirce and the British analyst John L. Austin. He is also conversant with social science research from Max Weber to Jane Loevinger and Lawrence Koh Iberg.
Jn fact the one translated essay by Habermas that directly addresses the problem of educational foun· datlons is a critique and reconstruction of Kohlberg' s theory of cog nitive moral deve lopment.' That theory, which has gained some popularity among moral educators, posits six stages which form a hierarchy of qualitative·distinct ways of deciding moral questions and, thus, of guid ing moral action. On the basis of 20 years of Investigation, Koh lberg has found that a child passes through a number of discrete and invariant stages of moral development, moving from an ego.centric basis for de· • ltN11~ttod l<i ~It~ K. On the basis of this theory, Kohlberg has developed an approach to moral education that pushes students to higher levels of moral development, primarily through the use of ethical d ilemmas. Thus, a student at Stage Two is presented in classroom discussion with a i ictional ethical situation that demands a more comprehensive analysis than is available within Stage Two reasoning. For exam. pie, a student is asked to formulate a course of action for an impoverished husband who is tempted to steal the ex· pensive medicine his wife needs to survive. Such a fie· tional situation hel ps the studen t to realize that individual needs and desires may compete with or be over.ridden by agreed·upon conventions. Kohlberg carefu lly sets up the terms of each fictional dilemma so that the s tudent is forced to look beyond his stage of moral development in order to arrive at a satisfactory resolution. The s tudent may be forced to move from an egocentric Stage Two decision to a Stage Three fear of punishment or towards a Stage Four refusal to show disrespect for the laws against theft. Confronting these dilemmas and examining possible resolutions is supposed to foster the cognitive develop· ment of students in relation to these ethical questions.
We shou Id note how Kohl berg defends this approach from the twin dangers of indoctrination and subjectivism. First, his approach concentrates on the form of the moral judgment rather than the content; it also demands a classroom atmosphere of d ialogue and mutual respect. This emphasis on form and interaction among students and teacher lessens the likelihood the teacher or the student's peers will impose their moral decisions on the individual s tudent and thereby deny him the opportunity to make his own moral choice . Secondly, Kohlberg con· tends that the greater c omprehensiveness of the latter stages of his hierarchy provides an objective progression In the structure If not in the co ntent of ethical judgments and moral explanations. Thus the value neutrality or subjectivity of the values clarification approach, for example, is replaced in Kohlberg's curriculum with a formal ob· jectivity.
There is much more to Kohlberg's theory of moral development, and much of it is helpful and convincing. But one quick ly notices the Kantian emphasis in Kohlberg's theory, especially as it focuses o n lhe cognitive factors Invo lved in moral decisions and ac tio ns. Kohlberg has indeed preserved individual choice through the various s tages o f moral development, but seems to Ig nore those factors that seem external and non·cognitive, fac tors that have been analyzed in great detail by the social sciences.
Kohl berg' s Justi fication tor proceeding in thi s manner Is that the cognitive aspects of moral development are the most important factor we have so far discovered. He would admit that non.cognitive and utilitarian factors in· fluence moral decisions, but he holds little hope for con· necting inlernal and external factors, or individual and social perspectives, beyond the limited connections now made in Chart I.
So, as valuable as Kohlberg's research and inter· prntations have been, we are still left with the unresolved dilemma of individual choice In a world that is un· avoidably social. We have not been able to approach the strict standard that Robert Paul Wolff sets forth in his analysis of Kantian ethics:
... an adequate foundation for moral theory requires some coherent way of understanding men's actions both as causally determined, predic table, natural events and as rationally initiated, pol Icy-directed ac· lio ns. None o f the familiar dodges, relaxations of the conflict, or reinterpretations designed to dissolve the problem will do .... If any sense is to be made o f responsibil ity and acllon, then one and the same bit of behavior which can be explained physiologically, pred icted statistically, and brought within the scope of a scien tific theory must also be capable of being consistently unders1ood as Issuing from the autonomous aclion of practical reason.' But this is precisely the challenge that Habermas takes up in h is reconstruction of Kohlberg 's theory. He But what is most important here is that Habermas calls our attention to the dynamic and social nature of moral development. He brings to Kohlberg's theory much-needed sociological insights Into how we become aware of ourselves as agents acting In the world, into how we come to see the interaction of in· tent ions and consequences in our actions, and of how we gradually recognize norms and the conditions for apply Ing those norms to our decisions and ac tions.
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Once again we must note that Habermas' recon· struc tion Is a detailed and complicated critique, as one can see from the various columns in Chart II. But hi s broadening of Kohlberg's base gives moral educalors a better theoretical foundation for their work in schools, one that moves beyond a static conception of already-formed individuals align ing themselves with already·es tablished moral principles or stages. As a result, a s tudent's question about why he can't follow hi s private value position and cheat on the next test need no t create a crisis In the moral education curriculum. In fact, from Haber. mas' perspective, such a question would provide the opportunity to consider a number of important ethical Issues. Rather than avoid the issue, a teacher could ad· vance the discussion by asking the student to consider the nature of conventional classroom rules against cheating, the tension that usually exists between private Interest and social welfare, and the role that the teacher often fulfills In the classroom as enforcer of society's rules and regulations.
Admitted ly, these topics may prove hazardous for the moral educato r. In the first place, the teacher's own role Is
likely to come under the scru tiny o f his students. Sec· ondly, these topics are sure to provide the teacher with more puzzling moments than are likely to occur within the supposedly neutral values clarification curriculum. The teacher might even find that simple questions, like those abOut cheating, lead finally to d iscussions concerned with things like the function of testing In the schools, a topic that seems complex no matter how advanced one's stage of cognitive development.
Th is last example points, however, to an additional benefit of Habermas' approach. That is, Habermas is able to posit a Seventh Stage of moral development, one that moves beyond a Kantian base in universalized duty to a basis in moral and political freedom. This base is dialogic and social rather than monologlc and subjective. At th is stage, we have more than the formal goal of Stage Six to serve as an end point for our theory o f moral development. we can now consider the conseq uences as well as the form of our moral deliberations, we can take into account factors like human needs and welfare, and we can finally add a certain degree of content and specificity to ethical theory and moral education.
To sum up, we might say that Habermas wants to con· sider social and external factors without reducing ethics to a utilitarian calculation; at the same time, he wants to preserve individual choice without adopting the ab· stractness of ethical formalism. His efforts certainly need greater development and application, but they do offer us a view of moral education that avoids the subjective and inconsequential flavor of so much o f what passes as moral education. In contras t, Habermas' reconstruc tion provides a basis for taking moral education seriously. It not only offers us a compell ing explanation of the in · terac tive nature o f ethical un iversals and the interplay be· tween individual autonomy and soc ial constraints, but it accounts for those conditions that surround moral education and ultimately moral choice.
